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2012 National Environmental Law Moot Court 
Competition Problem 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT 
 
__________________________________ 
STATE OF NEW UNION, ) 
Appellant and Cross-Appellee,                ) 
                 v.                                              ) 
UNITED STATES,                                    )   C.A. No. 11-1245 
Appellee and Cross-Appellant,                  ) 
                   v.                                              ) 
STATE OF PROGRESS,                           ) 
Appellee and Cross-Appellant.                  ) 
__________________________________  ) 
 
ORDER 
Following the issuance of the Order of the District Court 
dated June 2, 2011, in Civ. 148-2011, the State of New Union and 
the State of Progress each filed a Notice of Appeal.  New Union 
takes issue with the decision of the lower court with respect to its 
holding: that New Union lacked standing to challenge the permit 
issued by the United States Army Corps of Engineers (COE) to 
the Department of Defense (DOD) pursuant to the Clean Water 
Act (CWA) Section 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 to fill Lake Temp; that 
the COE has jurisdiction to issue the permit under CWA Section 
404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344; and that the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) did not violate the CWA when it resolved a dispute 
between the COE and the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) over whether the COE had jurisdiction to issue the permit 
under CWA Section 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, or EPA had the 
jurisdiction to do so under CWA Section 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342.  
The State of Progress takes issue with the decision of the lower 
court with respect to its holdings that the COE had jurisdiction to 
issue the permit under CWA Section 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, 
because Lake Temp is not navigable water. 
1
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Therefore, it is hereby ordered that the parties brief all of the 
following issues: 
1. Whether the State of New Union has standing in its 
sovereign capacity as owner and regulator of the groundwater in 
the state or in its parens patriae capacity as protector of its 
citizens who have an interest in the groundwater in the state.  
(The State of New Union and the State of Progress argue that 
New Union does have standing and that the court below erred in 
granting the United States’ motion for summary judgment on this 
issue; the United States argues that New Union does not have 
standing and that the court below was correct in granting 
summary judgment on this issue.) 
2. Whether the COE has jurisdiction to issue a permit under 
CWA Section 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, because Lake Temp is 
navigable water under CWA Sections 301(a), 404(a), and 502(7), 
33 U.S.C. §§ § 1311(a), 1344(a), 1362(7).  (The State of Progress 
argues that it does not because Lake Temp is not navigable and 
that the court below erred in granting the United States’ motion 
for summary judgment on the issue; the State of New Union and 
the United States argue that it does because Lake Temp is 
navigable and that the court below was correct in granting 
summary judgment on this issue.) 
3. Whether the COE has jurisdiction to issue a permit under 
CWA Section 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, or the EPA has jurisdiction 
to issue a permit under CWA Section 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342, for 
the discharge of slurry into Lake Temp.  (The State of New Union 
argues that EPA has jurisdiction to issue a permit under CWA 
Section 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342, for the discharge of slurry into 
Lake Temp and that the court below erred in holding that the 
COE has jurisdiction to issue a permit for that activity under 
CWA Section 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344; the State of Progress 
(arguing in the alternative) and the United States argue that the 
COE has jurisdiction to issue the permit and that the court below 
was correct in granting summary judgment on this issue.) 
4. Whether the decision by OMB that the COE had 
jurisdiction under CWA Section 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, and that 
EPA did not have jurisdiction under CWA Section 402, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1342, to issue a permit for DOD to discharge slurry into Lake 
Temp and EPA’s acquiescence in OMB’s decision violated the 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/1
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CWA.  (The State of New Union argues OMB had no authority to 
determine that COE had authority under CWA Section 404, 33 
U.S.C. § 1344, and EPA did not have authority under CWA 
Section 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342, to issue the permit and that the 
court below erred in holding that OMB’s intervention in the 
permit issuance process was not improper; the United States and 
the State of Progress argue that OMB’s actions were not improper 
and the court below was correct in granting summary judgment 
on this issue.) 
 
 SO ORDERED. 
 Entered this 15th day of September, 2011. 
 
[NOTE: No decisions decided or documents dated after September 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW UNION 
________________________________ 
State of New Union,                              ) 
Plaintiff,                                                 ) 
               v.                                              ) 
United States,                                        ) Civ. No. 148-2011 
Defendant,                                              ) 
              v.                                                ) 
State of Progress,                                  ) 




The State of New Union seeks review under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702, of 
an individual permit issued by the Secretary of the Army, acting 
through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE), under the 
authority of section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1344, to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to discharge a 
slurry of spent munitions into Lake Temp, an intermittent lake 
wholly within an arid military reservation owned by the United 
States in the State of Progress.  New Union argues that any 
permit for the discharge must be issued by the Administrator of 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pursuant to her 
authority to issue permits for the discharge of pollutants under 
CWA Section 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342, rather than by the COE 
under section 404.  Plaintiff also contends that the Defendant 
may not proceed with the project in the absence of a permit under 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
7000, but that challenge is not the subject of the cross-motions for 
summary judgment considered here.  The State of Progress, 
within whose boundaries the permitted activities will take place, 
has intervened.  New Union, the United States, and the State of 
Progress have filed motions for summary judgment.  New Union 
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Factual Background 
The relevant facts are not contested by the parties, except as 
indicated in this opinion.  Lake Temp is an oval-shaped 
intermittent body of water that is up to three miles wide and nine 
miles long during the rainy season in wet years, much smaller 
during the dry season, and wholly dry approximately one out of 
five years.  Although the lake is not far from the New Union 
border, Lake Temp at its highest water level is wholly within the 
State of Progress.  Surface water flows into Lake Temp from an 
eight hundred square mile watershed of surrounding mountains, 
located primarily in Progress, with a small portion located in New 
Union.  There is no outflow from the lake.  The Imhoff Aquifer is 
located almost one thousand feet below Lake Temp.  Although the 
aquifer follows the general contours of the lake, the aquifer is 
more extensive than the lake at its greatest extent.  Ninety-five 
percent of the aquifer is located within Progress, wholly under 
the boundaries of the military reservation, and five percent of the 
aquifer is located within New Union.  The military reservation 
boundary does not extend to the border with New Union.  Dale 
Bompers owns, operates and resides on a ranch located above the 
small portion of the Imhoff Aquifer in New Union.  The Imhoff 
Aquifer is not potable or usable in agriculture without treatment 
because of a high level of sulfur.  This information about the 
aquifer has been included in New Union’s groundwater inventory 
since the time that the project was first proposed. 
When the lake holds water during migration seasons, ducks 
have historically used it as a stopover in their migration from the 
Arctic to southern climes and back.  Hundreds, perhaps 
thousands of duck hunters also used it over at least the last one 
hundred years; most have been residents of Progress but about a 
quarter were from out of state.  A Progress state highway runs 
along the southern side of Lake Temp, at the edge of the military 
reservation and within one hundred feet of the shore when the 
lake is filled to its historic high.  The state highway intersects 
with several roads that lead into New Union.  When the lake 
became part of a military reservation in 1952, the DOD posted 
signs along both sides of the highway at intervals of one hundred 
yards, twenty-five feet from the edge of the road; warning of 
danger and that entry was illegal.  There is no fence.  There are 
5
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clearly visible trails leading from the road to the lake and they 
show signs of rowboats and canoes being dragged between the 
highway and the lake.  DOD has taken no measures beyond the 
signs to restrict public entry, although DOD has knowledge that 
people continue to use the lake for hunting and bird watching. 
DOD proposes to construct a facility on the shore of Lake 
Temp to receive and prepare a wide variety of munitions for 
discharge into the lake.  Preparation will begin by emptying 
munitions of liquid, semi-solid and granular contents, which 
include many chemicals on the Clean Water Act § 311 list of 
hazardous substances, and mixing the contents with chemicals to 
assure they are not explosive.  The remaining solids, primarily 
metals, will be ground and pulverized.  Finally, water will be 
introduced to both sets of waste to form a slurry, which will be 
sprayed from a movable multi-port pipe.  The current plan is to 
spray only the portions of the lake that are dry.  Due to the arid 
nature of this location, the slurry will dry out soon after contact.  
The pipe will be moved continually to deposit the slurry evenly 
over the entire dry bed of the lake, so that eventually the entire 
lakebed will be raised by several feet.  DOD estimates that when 
the operation is complete, the lake’s top water elevation will be 
approximately six feet higher and its surface area will be two 
square miles larger than at the present time.  This process will 
take several years, but once finished, it will not be recurring.  The 
COE will continually grade the edges of the new lakebed so that 
runoff from the surrounding mountains will flow unimpeded onto 
it.  The lake, of course, will still remain, since it is at the low 
point in the drainage basin and there is nowhere else for 
precipitation falling in the basin to flow.  Over time, alluvial 
deposits from precipitation falling on the mountains and flowing 
into the basin will cover the lakebed again, returning it to its pre-
operation condition, albeit at a higher elevation.  The COE’s EIS 
does not project that the Lake would intrude on New Union under 
any of the scenarios studied for the project. 
 
The Motions 
After discovery, the Secretary of the Army filed a motion for 
summary judgment on the basis that 1) New Union does not have 
standing to appeal the permit issuance; 2) the COE had 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/1
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jurisdiction to issue a permit for the discharge of fill under section 
404 because: a) Lake Temp is navigable water; and b) Southeast 
Alaska Conservation Council v. Coeur Alaska, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 
2458 (2009), decided that a section 404 permit is required in this 
situation rather than a section 402 permit; and 3) the 
participation by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 
the decision that a section 404 permit rather than a section 402 
permit should be issued did not violate the CWA.  New Union 
filed a cross-motion for summary judgment that 1) it has standing 
to appeal the permit issuance; and 2) Lake Temp is navigable 
water; but 3) the COE lacks jurisdiction to issue a permit under 
section 404 because the materials it authorizes for discharge are 
primarily pollutants rather than fill material, requiring a permit 
from EPA under section 402 rather than from the COE under 
section 404; and 4) participation by OMB in the decision-making 
process violated the CWA.  Progress also filed a cross-motion for 
summary judgment asserting that: 1) New Union does have 
standing; and either 2) Lake Temp is not within the jurisdiction 
of the CWA and the activity requires no permit under either 
section 402 or 404 because Lake Temp is not navigable water; or 
3) the COE has jurisdiction to issue the permit under section 404 
pursuant to Coeur Alaska; and 4) OMB’s participation in the 
decision-making process did not violate the CWA. 
 
Discussion 
A.  Standing 
New Union argues it is injured in its sovereign capacity with 
regard to that part of the Imhoff Aquifer located within New 
Union and in its parens patriae capacity with regard to its 
citizens who may be injured by the contamination of the aquifer.  
The United States argues that New Union cannot sufficiently 
establish that the discharge authorized by the Permit will cause 
injury to it or its citizens to support standing. Progress did not 
contest New Union’s standing in the District Court and supports 
New Union’s standing in the 12th Circuit.  New Union argues it 
has a special interest as an affected state, subjecting it to a more 
favorable test for standing under Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 
497, 518-20 (2007). The United States contends that 
Massachusetts does not apply.  Significantly, four of the Justices 
7
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in that case dissented from the majority’s view that states are 
subject to a relaxed standing test, but New Union does not even 
meet the majority’s relaxed test.  Although New Union has 
presented circumstantial evidence that contaminated water from 
the permitted activity will enter the Imhoff Aquifer (because the 
land between the lakebed and the aquifer is primarily 
unconsolidated alluvial fill), New Union has presented no 
evidence as to when the pollution will reach the edge of the 
aquifer beneath New Union, the strength of the pollution when it 
reaches that edge, or even that it will ever reach that edge.  New 
Union admits as much, stating that the timing and severity of the 
pollution’s impact on the portion of the Imhoff that underlies New 
Union depends on the direction and rate of flow of groundwater in 
the aquifer and the top and bottom elevations of the aquifer 
throughout its expanse, but they are presently unknown. 
New Union presented evidence establishing that the 
information needed regarding the movement of pollutants in the 
Imhoff Aquifer can only be established by drilling and sampling 
from a grid of monitoring wells throughout the aquifer.  Its 
evidence also establishes that if installation of such a grid of wells 
began today, conclusive results might not be available until after 
the permitted activity begins.  Finally, although New Union 
claims it is willing to install and operate the wells and to collect 
the data, it avers that it cannot do so without permission from 
DOD, but that DOD will not grant access to the military 
reservation for that or other non-military purposes.  DOD does 
not deny these allegations, but adds that New Union has never 
filed an application with DOD to install monitoring wells.  DOD 
also responds that New Union admits its injury, if there is one, is 
susceptible to proof, and that New Union is capable of developing 
that proof but has not done so.  DOD also argues that it 
completed an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on the 
project under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 4321-4370H, in 2002 and that New Union did not comment on 
or object to either the scoping of the EIS or the final EIS on the 
basis of the unknowns concerning the Imhoff Aquifer.  The COE 
followed its normal procedures in terms of public notice at all 
stages of its NEPA activities.  All of the facts regarding the lake 
and the aquifer mentioned in this decision were mentioned in the 
EIS.  DOD suggests that since New Union is now time-barred 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/1
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from objecting to the EIS, it is also estopped from raising issues 
here that could have been dealt with in the EIS.  New Union, of 
course, has the burden of proving that it will be injured by the 
complained-of activity and it has not carried that burden.  There 
is no evidence that pollution of groundwater owned or regulated 
by New Union is imminent or ever will happen.  The occurrence, 
timing and severity of such contamination are completely 
speculative.  The evidence of present and future injury the state 
presented in Massachusetts v. EPA was far less speculative than 
that presented here by New Union. 
New Union’s parens patriae standing as a representative of 
its citizens is exemplified by Dale Bompers, who owns, operates 
and resides on a ranch above the Imhoff Aquifer in New Union.  
Bompers claims the value of his ranch will be diminished if the 
Imhoff Aquifer below his ranch is contaminated by the permitted 
discharge, although he presents no proof of a loss in property 
value.  He does not presently use the Imhoff Aquifer, for it is not 
potable or fit for agricultural use without treatment, due to 
naturally occurring sulfur in the aquifer.  He has no definite 
plans to use the Imhoff Aquifer in the future.  Indeed, under the 
New Union statute regulating use of groundwater, Bompers could 
not withdraw groundwater from the aquifer without a permit 
from the New Union Department of Natural Resources (DNR).  
The statute requires DNR to determine that permitted 
withdrawals will not deplete groundwater over a period of twenty 
years.  Although the statute does not limit withdrawals to owners 
of land above the groundwater to be withdrawn, it gives a 
preference to such owner if withdrawals are limited by 
threatened depletion.  Under the statute, no one has rights in 
groundwater unless and until the DNR issues a withdrawal 
permit.  No such permits have been issued to date with respect to 
the Imhoff Aquifer, and New Union law prohibits withdrawal of 
groundwater without a state-issued permit.  On these facts and 
the facts related in the above paragraph, because Bompers would 
have no injury to establish standing to challenge the permit 
issuance, New Union does not have derivative standing under a 
parens patriae theory. 
9
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Although this disposes of New Union’s claim, for purposes of 
judicial economy in the event of an appeal I will address the 
remaining issues raised by the parties. 
 
B. Navigability 
Progress argues that Lake Temp is not a “water of the United 
States” subject to the jurisdiction of the CWA and therefore does 
not require a permit from either EPA under section 402 or the 
COE under section 404.  The lake is only intermittent and 
regularly disappears entirely.  Progress argues that intermittent 
bodies of water are not navigable, citing Rapanos v. United 
States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).  It is entirely intrastate; located 
within a basin with no outlets, and flowing nowhere.  It is not 
used in interstate commerce, except in its role as a stopover for 
migratory birds and Progress contends that is not a basis for 
categorization as navigable water under Solid Waste Authority of 
Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 
531 U.S. 159 (2001).  The ponds at issue in SWANCC were from 
less than an acre to several acres in surface area and from a few 
inches deep to several feet deep.  They were isolated from and 
had no connection to navigable waters.  The COE justified their 
navigability only by reference to the “migratory bird rule” which 
defined water as navigable, inter alia, if it was used as habitat by 
birds in interstate migration.  The Court overturned the 
migratory bird rule as outside the bounds of the CWA.  Progress 
argues that SWANCC perfectly matches the situation at Lake 
Temp.  DOD and New Union respond that Lake Temp is several 
square miles, while the largest pond in SWANCC was only 
several acres.  Progress replies that small size may prevent 
navigability, but large size does not establish it.  The COE and 
New Union argue further that Lake Temp has been part of the 
highway of interstate commerce for interstate hunters, who not 
only have hunted from the shores of the lake for over one hundred 
years, but also have hunted from boats and canoes on the lake 
and have rowed or paddled across the lake to hunt from the shore 
opposite the highway.  The size and use in interstate commerce of 
Lake Temp differ greatly from the size and use of the ponds in 
SWANCC, making that decision distinguishable.  Lake Temp is 
well within the description of water bodies that have traditionally 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/1
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been held navigable because of use by interstate travelers (rather 
than use by interstate birds). 
 
C. Section 402 or 404? 
The Supreme Court recently addressed the relationship 
between section 402 and Section 404 in a similar context.  In 
Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council the 
Court held that the discharge of slurry into a lake, elevating and 
changing the bottom configuration of the lake, was the discharge 
of fill material requiring a section 404 permit, rather than the 
discharge of a pollutant, requiring a section 402 permit.  Coeur is 
similar to this case in all relevant respects.  In both cases, a lake 
was to be filled.  In both cases, the material filling it was slurry.  
In both cases, the slurry was a pollutant as well as fill material.  
In both cases, the COE issued a permit and EPA did not veto it.  
In Coeur, the Court held that the issuance of a section 404 permit 
made the discharge legal under section 301(c) of the CWA, 
obviating the need for a section 402 permit.  This Court is bound 
by that decision to uphold the COE permit to fill Lake Temp. 
New Union seeks to distinguish Coeur because the material 
discharged in Coeur was crushed rock, an inert material that is 
more a fill material than a pollutant, whereas here the material 
discharged will be spent munitions: liquid and semi-solid 
chemicals and pulverized metals, a toxic pollutant rather than an 
inert fill.  While it might have been rational for Congress to make 
this distinction, it did not.  Section 502(6) defines pollutants by 
categories, including “munitions,” “chemical waste,” and “rock,” 
rather than by degrees of toxicity or inertness and section 404 
does not define fill by degrees of toxicity or inertness.  The 
distinction urged by New Union is not relevant to whether a 
section 402 or section 404 permit is required.  The materials to be 
discharged in both cases fit well within the definitions of both 
“pollutant” and “fill.”  The more relevant defined term is “fill 
material.”  If it is fill material, Coeur decided, it is subject to a 
section 404 permit, not a section 402 permit, because the CWA 
provides that section 402 permits cannot authorize the discharge 
of fill material.  If it “has the effect of . . . [c]hanging the bottom 
elevation” it is fill material. 40 C.F.R. § 232.2.  There is no 
question on this record that the discharge will elevate and change 
11
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the bottom elevation of Lake Temp. Indeed, New Union does not 
contest that fact.  In summary, the discharge is both fill material 
and a pollutant.  As long as it is legitimate fill material, it is 
subject to a section 404 permit, not a section 402 permit. 
New Union also seeks to distinguish Coeur because the lake 
in Coeur served the purpose of a treatment pond that otherwise 
would have to be constructed, with a greater environmental 
detriment, whereas here the lake is not serving as a treatment 
alternative.  To the contrary, while the lake in Coeur was treating 
the mine’s effluent so that it met CWA effluent requirements 
when lake wastewater was subsequently discharged to 
downstream waters, the lake here is preventing the discharge of 
any pollutants or wastewater to other navigable waters, in effect 
creating zero discharge of pollutants, the goal of the statute. CWA 
Section 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1). 
New Union also seeks to distinguish Coeur because, in Coeur, 
the COE made its decision as an uninterested regulator, while 
here the COE is an interested subsidiary of the permit applicant.  
It argues that the COE, as a regulator, is supposed to be 
protecting the public.  Here, however, the COE cannot help but be 
serving the interests of DOD, a classic conflict of interest 
situation.  New Union argues that a more egregious case of the 
fox guarding the hen house is difficult to imagine.  It argues that 
having EPA issue a 402 permit rather than the COE issuing a 
section 404 permit will easily cure the conflict of interest. 
The COE comments that New Union’s argument leads 
nowhere.  Granted, the COE is part of DOD, the COE is issuing 
the permit to DOD, and the COE is in a subordinate relationship 
to DOD.  Is New Union arguing that if DOD is the permit 
applicant, an organization outside of DOD must issue the permit 
or that if the COE is the permit issuer, DOD may not apply for a 
section 404 permit?  Those suggestions rewrite the statute, which 
neither this Court nor Plaintiff can do.  Congress determined the 
COE would be the issuer of section 404 permits, that decision is 
properly a legislative decision, and courts cannot rewrite the 
statute to place section 404 permit issuance authority elsewhere 
when DOD is the applicant for a section 404 permit.  In any 
event, the COE must apply the same legislative and regulatory 
criteria when issuing a permit to DOD that it applies when 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/1
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issuing a permit to any other entity.  And the public may 
challenge the issuance of such permits if they do not meet those 
statutory and regulatory criteria, as New Union is doing here.  
This situation, although somewhat awkward in appearance, is 
common.  Many agencies must issue a permit to themselves or to 
an entity in the same department.  EPA, for instance, issues 
permits for EPA laboratories and other EPA facilities with 
discharges requiring section 402 permits. 
 
D. OMB’s Participation 
New Union notes that EPA made a positive decision in Coeur 
not to veto the COE’s section 404 permit.  Indeed, in Coeur EPA 
issued a section 402 permit for the discharge from the lake to 
downstream waters, incorporating the effluent limitations 
applicable to treated wastewater from the operation.  In essence, 
EPA agreed with and participated in the COE’s interpretation of 
the statute under the facts of the case.  But here, New Union 
argues, EPA was preparing to exercise its authority to veto the 
COE’s section 404 permit and issue a section 402 permit, but the 
OMB instructed EPA not to do so.1  EPA argued to OMB that the 
nature of the discharge here was significantly different from the 
discharge in Coeur, so as to warrant a different outcome, 
requiring a section 402 permit at least for treatment of the non-
fill liquid and semi-solid portion of the material before discharge 
to navigable waters.  New Union argues that Congress conferred 
authority directly on the Administrator of EPA “to administer” 
the CWA generally, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d), and in particular to veto 
permits proposed by the COE, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c).  Congress 
conferred no authority directly or indirectly on OMB to issue 
permits or veto permits under 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342 or 1344 or to 
decide which permit should be issued in any particular instance.  
New Union argues that OMB violated the statute by directing 
EPA not to veto the permit and EPA violated the statute by 
acquiescing in OMB’s directive, both “incompatible with the will 
of Congress and . . . [un]sustainable as a valid exercise of the 
President’s Article II powers.” Envtl. Def. Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. 
 
 1. The COE and EPA both sent briefing papers on the issue to OMB and 
attended a meeting with OMB, which culminated in OMB’s oral decision and 
directive.  The papers are not in the record of this case. 
13
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Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1986).  One effect of OMB’s action is to place 
the interpretation of the statute by OMB, not an administrator of 
any portion of the statute, and the COE, the administrator of one 
section of the statute, section 404, before this Court rather than 
the interpretation of EPA, administrator of the more than one 
hundred other sections of the statute, including the basic 
prohibition in section 301(a), and of parts of section 404 itself.  
New Union argues this prevents the Court from properly 
interpreting the statute using a Chevron test.  Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
The COE comments that New Union’s argument is a 
collateral attack on EPA’s decision not to veto the COE permit.  
The COE points out that EPA’s decision not to veto a section 404 
permit is not subject to judicial review because EPA’s authority to 
veto section 404 permits is wholly discretionary, and “agency 
action . . . committed to agency discretion by law” is not subject to 
judicial review, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).  Even if EPA’s decision not to 
veto the COE permit was subject to judicial review, review would 
be limited to whether the decision was arbitrary or capricious 
under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).  EPA’s decision not to veto the COE 
permit was neither arbitrary nor capricious because it was either 
required by or consistent with the Court’s ruling in Coeur. 
New Union protests that EPA made no decision not to veto 
the COE permit; the OMB, in violation of the CWA, made that 
decision.  The COE admits that OMB resolved a dispute between 
EPA and the COE over the permit, pursuant to procedures for 
reconciling disputes within the executive branch first established 
by Exec. Order No. 12,088, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,707 (Oct. 13, 1978).  
Nonetheless, the COE argues that after OMB’s decision EPA took 
no further action, i.e., it decided not to veto the COE permit and 
EPA’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious for two reasons.  
First, EPA’s decision is required by or consistent with Coeur, 
regardless of OMB’s participation.  Second, all the executive 
power of the United States is vested by the Constitution in the 
President, not the Administrator of EPA or the Secretary of the 
Army, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.  Moreover, the Constitution 
charges the President with the duty to “take Care that the Laws 
be faithfully executed.”  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  That gives the 
President both the duty and the power to assure that all 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol3/iss1/1
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discretionary decisions made within the executive branch, 
including those made by the Secretary of the Army and the 
Administrator of EPA, are faithful to the Constitution, treaties 
and laws of the Nation.  That power and duty necessarily 
includes the authority to resolve legal and policy disputes 
between executive branch entities.  Differences of interpretation 
often occur between two agencies in the executive branch and 
sometimes they must be decided before the executive branch 
takes action.  They certainly must be decided before the 
government takes a litigation position, as it had to do here.  If 
OMB had not already decided the matter, the Attorney General 
would have to have decided the matter prior to filing responses in 
this case.  The participation by OMB in EPA’s decision did not 
violate the CWA, did not make EPA’s decision subject to judicial 
review and did not render EPA’s decision arbitrary or capricious.  
Finally, OMB’s participation did not affect the COE’s decision to 
issue the permit or the terms of the permit it issued. 
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment on the CWA counts and denies 
Plaintiff’s motion: 
Plaintiff has no standing; 
The COE had jurisdiction to issue a section 404 permit for 
the addition of fill to Lake Temp because Lake Temp is a 
navigable water and the slurry is a fill material; and 
OMB’s dispute resolution between EPA and the COE did not 
violate the CWA. 
 
  SO ORDERED. 
Romulus N. Remus  
United States District Judge 
 
June 2, 2011 
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